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In recent times, significant media and legal attention has been paid to the use
of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) in areas such as Pakistan and Yemen.' The
current terminology being used in the media and other areas debating this issue
varies. As well as RPA (the current term being preferred in some military circles),
other common terms include "drone", "armed drone", unmanned (or uninhabited)
aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned (or uninhabited) aircraft system (UAS); and when
some form of armament is also involved, sometimes the word "combat" is after
unmanned (or uninhabited), leading to the acronyms UCAS or UCAV. The legal
issues discussed have generally concerned the use of force, the status of the
operators of the aircraft (e.g., military or civilian intelligence agent), the status of
the intended target, or the injury caused to someone and the damage caused to
something other than the intended target. Comparatively little attention has been
paid to legal issues concerning the aircraft themselves; however, the rise in the use
and variety of RPA highlights some interesting legal issues concerning the aircraft
themselves. This article looks at the international law concerning the "status" of
RPA and the legal requirement, if any, for applying "markings" to RPA.
* Wing Commander, Royal Australian Air Force. This paper was written in a personal capacity
and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian
Defence Force.
1. See generally, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat!7 Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111 th
Cong. 5 (2010), available at http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&
view=article&id=621:03-23-2010-national-security-qrise-of-the-drones-unmanned-systems-and-the-
future-of-warq&catid=17; Rise of the Drones 11: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, llth Cong. 5 (2010), available at http://oversight. house.gov/index.php?option
=com content&view=article&id=681%3A04-28-201 0-qrise-of-the-drones-ii-examining-the-legality-of-
unmanned-targetingq&catid=17%3Asubcommittee-on-national-security&temid=l; Gary Solis, CIA
Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11 /AR2010031
103653.html; Marc A. Thiessen, In CIA's Drone Mission, Who Will Protect the CIA?, WASH. POST
(June 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR20100
60701986.html?nav=hcmoduletmv; Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A. 's
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fafactmayer; Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the
Use ofArmed Drones, Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. (forthcoming 2011).
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While this article is concerned only with the aircraft, it is worth recalling that:
Unmanned aircraft systems generally consist of (1) multiple aircraft,
which can be expendable or recoverable and can carry lethal or non-
lethal payloads; (2) a flight control station; (3) information and retrieval
or processing stations; and (4) in some cases, wheeled land vehicles that
carry launch and recovery platforms.2
As for the RPA themselves:
Over 1100 makes and models of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) are
currently on the market or in development in more than 50 countries...
[involving] a diverse collection of fixed wing, rotorcraft, and lighter-
than-air flying machines, available in a wide variety of sizes and
capabilities. The known technologies range from "micro" UAVs that
are, in reality, flying robots designed to look and behave like a "bug," fit
in the palm of a hand, and carry a high-resolution camera, to 25,000-
pound turbojets with wingspans wider than a Boeing 737, operating at
or above 60,000 feet at speeds in excess of 530 miles per hour for over
35 hours at a time.4 Others designed for scientific research have flown
as high as 100,000 feet and have stayed in the air for nearly three days
without landing.
5
II. STATUS AND MARKING OF RPA: STATE AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT
International law divides aircraft into two broad categories: state aircraft and
civil aircraft.6 The distinction between civil and state aircraft, albeit not always
with the same terms, appears to date from the early 20th century. A reference to
state aircraft usually means, as a minimum, aircraft that are "used in military,
customs and police services." 8  It is possible, though, to use the term "state
aircraft" to mean all aircraft in the exclusive use or possession of a State and not be
limited by the definition in the Chicago Convention.9 As a result, there are two
current views of which aircraft are state aircraft. One view is that despite the
vague wording of the Chicago Convention, only military, customs and police
2. Rise of the Drones, supra note 1, at 4 (written testimony of Michael J. Sullivan, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management).
3. Douglas Marshall, Unmanned Aerial Systems and International Civil Aviation Organization
Regulations, 85 N. DAK. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (citations omitted).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3(a), Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; see also Definition of State Aircraft, THE EUROPEAN
ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.eurocontrol.
int/mil/public/standardpage/stateac.html.
7. Jiri Homik, Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, XXVI ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 110,
111 (2001).
8. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(b).
9. See Bin Cheng, State Ships and State Aircraft, II CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMs 225, 227-28
(1958).
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aircraft may be state aircraft.'l The other view is that other aircraft engaged in
purely state activities (e.g. coast guard or search and rescue) may also be state
aircraft."' Regardless of which position is correct, there are two main
consequences that flow from being a state aircraft. First, state aircraft are not
subject to the Chicago Convention, and particularly the detailed air navigation
rules. Second, state aircraft enjoy certain immunities and rights.12 There is no
reason not to apply the same legal divisions and consequences to RPA as defined
in the Chicago Convention.13 So, while the Chicago Convention is not directly
applicable to state aircraft (aside from article 3), there is no reason to treat RPA
differently from "normal" state aircraft.
No further requirements are specified in the Chicago Convention for an
aircraft to have the status of a state aircraft. For example, no particular markings-
national or otherwise-are specified. This is particularly noteworthy as article 20
of the Chicago Convention states: "Every aircraft engaged in international air
navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks.'
14
However, the Chicago Convention applies to only civil aircraft and not to state
aircraft. 15 Accordingly, the Chicago Convention does not require any particular
markings, registration, etc., for state aircraft. 16 Interestingly, Article 10 of the 1919
Paris Convention stated: "All aircraft engaged in international navigation shall
bear their nationality and registration marks... 17  However, it is difficult to
10. ICAO, SECRETARIAT STUDY ON "CIVIL/STATE AIRCRAFT" ICAO Doc. LC/29 -WP/2-I,
Attach. 1, 5.2.1-5.2.6 (1994) [hereinafter ICAO Study]; see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 85, 13(1) (Louise Doswald-Beck ed.,
1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; Homik, supra note 7, at 122 n. 48; Lieutenant Colonel
Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft over the High Seas in the Global War on Tenor,
59 A.F. L. REv. 73, 113 (2007). But see ICAO Study, Attach. 2, 13 (calls into doubt part of 5.2.4).
11. Eur. Comm. for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of
Prisoners, 1 90, Doc. No. CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Venice Commission]; see also
Michael Milde, "Rendition Flights" and International Air Law, REDRESS, June 2008, at 8; Homik,
supra note 7 at 122-23; I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 40, 42 (8th
rev. ed. 2006); ROYAL AUSTL. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS 1.4 (2004),
available at http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/156/AAP1003-Operations-Law-for-
RAAF-Commanders-2nd-Edition.aspx.
12. The extent of those immunities and rights is discussed below.
13. See Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 8; DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, at 2-4
(1976) (no longer in force); Donald Ward, The Law of Military Aircraft in War and Peace, at 5 (1970)
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, McGill University) (available at http://digitool.library.
mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object-id=46681 &localbase=GENO1-MCG02); Marshall, supra
note 3, at 697-98.
14. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 20.
15. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(a).
16. See NICHOLAS M. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 195
n.288 (2nd ed. 2002) (discussing the non-requirement for registration of state aircraft).
17. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, art. 10, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. It is "generally considered the forerunner to the Chicago
Convention." ICAO Study, supra note 10, T 2.1.2.
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determine whether article 10 applied to state aircraft. This is because article 30
provided that: "All State aircraft other than military, customs and police aircraft
shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be subject to all the provisions
of the present Convention. 18  A clear inference from this provision is that the
Paris Convention did not in general apply to certain types of state aircraft.19
In a discussion of the criteria for determining whether an aircraft is a military
versus a civil aircraft, Milde writes:
This wording ["used" and "services"], in the absence of any other
guidance, suggests that the drafters had in mind a functional approach to
the determination of the status of the aircraft as civil and military:
regardless of the design, technical characteristics, registration,
ownership etc.; the status of the aircraft is determined by the function it
actually performs at a given time.
20
Milde's argument and conclusion applies equally to other types of state
aircraft. Williams adopts a similar position, stating that whether an aircraft is a
state aircraft depends upon function, and not "design or technical characteristics,
call sign, registration, or markings-all of which fall within the competence of its
state of nationality." 21 Whether an aircraft is, for the purposes of the Chicago
Convention, a state or civil aircraft, it is the "usage of the aircraft in question [that]
is the determining criterion, and not, by themselves, other factors such as aircraft
registration and markings.....
22
Notwithstanding that there appears to be no strict legal requirement for state
aircraft to be marked as such, it often seems assumed that an aircraft will bear
some sort of marking.2 3 Other statements indicating an assumption of marking
include: "state aircraft, including military aircraft, are also marked to indicate their
nationality"; 24 and "state aircraft may include aircraft which, in light of their
mission, display appropriate state markings....25
The importance of the expectations of States cannot be over emphasized.
When one starts out with the somewhat ambiguous legal position expressed in
article 3 of the Chicago Convention,26 and the fact that States may essentially
18. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 30.
19. Hornik, supra note 7, at 112-13 (discussing the application of the Paris Convention and not
just Chapter VII thereof to state aircraft).
20. Milde, supra note 11, at 9.
21. Williams, supra note 10, at 107 (emphasis added); see also ICAO Study, supra note 10,
5.3.3 (referring to use and other criteria to help ascertain the status of an aircraft).
22. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 1.3.
23. Id. 5.3.2.
24. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 1 2-4; UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCH., AIR FORCE OPERATIONS & THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR AIR, SPACE & CYBER
FORCES 23-24 at n.52 (Tonya Hagmaier et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) [hereinafter U.S. AIR FORCE JAG
SCHOOL].
25. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 11, at 42.
26. Homik, supra note 7, at 130 ("[I]t is almost impossible in accordance with the present wording
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choose how to classify one another's aircraft,27 then lack of markings only
exacerbates the issue.
Despite the aforementioned legal uncertainty, some general observations can
be made. At a minimum, state aircraft include aircraft used in military, customs
and police services. Whether an aircraft is being so used is primarily a functional
test.28 An aircraft need not bear markings to be a state aircraft, but absence of such
markings is likely to prejudice the finding that the aircraft is a state aircraft by
other States. RPA can be state aircraft and all of the proceeding points apply to
RPA. A unique feature of RPA compared to manned aircraft is that RPA can be
quite small in size. However, the relevant international law does not change.29
III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF STATE AIRCRAFT
While this article is not primarily concerned with the detail of the rights and
liabilities of state aircraft, some discussion of the topic is important to illustrate the
importance of determining whether an RPA is a civil or state aircraft. State aircraft
enjoy certain rights and immunities, including immunity "from the jurisdiction of
the courts of a territorial state." 30 The applicable law on a state aircraft is the
jurisdiction, including criminal jurisdiction, of the "flag" State. 31 A significant
immunity is that state aircraft are not subject to "foreign jurisdiction in respect of
search and inspection" without consent.32 Interestingly, the 1919 Paris Convention
drew a distinction between types of state aircraft, with only military aircraft
enjoying "the privileges which are customarily accorded to foreign ships of war";
33
while other types of state aircraft did not enjoy such privileges.34 Writing in 1970,
Ward expressed doubt as to whether States would generally accept this principle
with respect to military aircraft,35 while a nearly contemporary writer seemed to be
of Article 3 to determine with one hundred percent certainty the legal status of an aircraft, i.e. whether it
is a civil or state aircraft.").
27. Id. ("Neither the operator of an aircraft nor the state of registry can assure that the aircraft
concerned will not be treated in another state as a state aircraft . . Thus, a situation can easily occur in
which an aircraft is deemed in one state to be a civil aircraft and in another state to be a state aircraft.
The decision of the latter state, in many cases, might be deemed arbitrary (in many cases of a political
nature) rather than stemming from the legal term 'discretion."').
28. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 34 (Kluwer Law Int'l ed.,
7th rev. ed. 2001).
29. Marshall, supra note 3, at 699 ("There is no minimum size described, so even a radio-
controlled model aircraft would be covered under a literal reading of the definition, and no legal
authorities state otherwise. In the ICAO regulatory scheme, no distinction is made between manned
and unmanned aircraft.").
30. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 12.6.1 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2004); MINISTRY PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH,
COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INT'L LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 53
(2010).
31. Williams, supra note 10, at 99.
32. Venice Commission, supra note 11, 95.
33. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 32.
34. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 33.
35. Ward, supra note 13, at 24.
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of the opposite view.36 The better view today is that military aircraft enjoy
sovereign immunity.37 Further, such immunity applies to all types of state aircraft
38and not just those used in military, police and customs services.
Separate from the immunity issue is the issue of the rights enjoyed by state
aircraft. For example, only certain types of aircraft may legally intercept suspected
pirate ships and aircraft on or over the high seas.39 That right is reserved to
military aircraft and "aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on
government service and authorized to that effect." 4° Similar rules apply to what
type of aircraft may exercise a right of visit of a foreign ship on the high seas, and
41may engage in hot pursuit. While some have stated that this right is limited to
military, police or customs aircraft,42 that view seems to be based on interpreting
article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention as an exclusive list of what may be state
aircraft for all purposes. The better view is that as long as the aircraft is "on
government service and authorized to that effect," then any aircraft may exercise
the function and the aircraft need not be a state aircraft per article 3(b) of the
Chicago Convention.
43
Conversely, State aircraft do not enjoy the rights afforded under the Chicago
Convention to civil aircraft. For example, non-scheduled civil aircraft do not need
permission from a contracting state to fly over or to make stops for non-traffic
purposes; assistance in distress; the non-use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight; where an accident has occurred, the state of registry has a right to appoint
observers to be present at the investigation and to receive a copy of the report and
its findings; and none of the aviation security instruments apply to state aircraft.44
By way of analogy from the law of the sea and flagless vessels, States may
intercept Stateless aircraft over the high seas.45 In this respect, an aircraft showing
36. Abu Kasim Thaher, International Law and the Legal Status of Military Aircraft in Peacetime
62 (April 1969) (unpublished L.L.M Thesis, McGill University), available at http://digitool.
Library.McGill.CA:80/R/-? func=dbin-jump-full&object id=47234&current base=GEN01.
37. Cheng, supra note 9, at 256; J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES
RESPONSES TO ExcEssivE MARITIME CLAIMS 466 (2d ed. 1996); 73 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2.2.2 (A.R. Thomas & James C.
Duncan eds.) (1999) [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS]; U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra
note 24, at 23; ROYAL AUSTRL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 2.3; MINISTRY PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 30, at 53.
38. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 5.2.6.
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 107, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter Law of the Sea].
40. Id.
41. Id., arts. 110(4), (5) and 111(5).
42. Williams, supra note 10, at 113.
43. POULANTZAS, supra note 16, at 194.
44. Williams, supra note 10, at 106 n.2 10.
45. Id. at 128; see also Law of the Sea, supra note 39, art. I I0(l)(d); ROBIN R. CHURCHILL &
ALAN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (3d ed. 1999); LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 37,
3.11.2.3.
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no national markings is the equivalent of a ship not flying a flag.46 So, consistent
with the conclusions made above, while technically there is no requirement for an
aircraft to bear markings to be a state aircraft under the Chicago Convention, the
lack of markings will operate to prejudice the finding that the aircraft is a state
aircraft by other States.
In summary, consistent with the law that applies to ships, the better view is
that a state can only claim the immunities and particularly the rights associated
with a state aircraft in international airspace if the aircraft displays its status as a
state aircraft via appropriate markings.47
IV. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER CONSORTIUMS
While state aircraft are automatically associated in people's minds with a
single State, that need not necessarily be the case. A reference to a state aircraft
can, in the abstract, merely be thought of as the opposite of a civil aircraft, with
civil aircraft essentially meaning private aircraft. 48 For example, early work on air
law did not use "state aircraft" but rather "public aircraft. ' '49  However,
international practice has developed to the point where aircraft are registered in
one State and one State only. Pursuant to the Paris Convention, an aircraft could
not "be validly registered in more than one State." 50 While not directly applicable
to state aircraft, this provision has influenced the development of the law. For
instance, in 1923 a proposed article, of application to all types of aircraft, stated
that "[n]o aircraft may possess more than one nationality."' 5' This theme continues
through to the present law, and applies not only to the non-availability of joint-
state registration/nationality, 52 but also requires that registration/nationality be
attributable to a State and not an international organization (not even one with
legal personality).53
As a matter of law, the foregoing applies strictly only to the
registration/nationality issue. So while a state aircraft must have the nationality of
an actual State (and only one State), this does not preclude international
organizations from performing some functions traditionally associated with a State.
For example, "[imn certain circumstances, such as managing specific aircraft or
managing the ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses allocated to NATO, NATO can be
46. See Williams, supra note 10, at 129. Although note that Williams refers to article 20 of the
Chicago Convention, which is not applicable to state aircraft.
47. See Venice Commission, supra note 11, 103
48. This was the distinction adopted in the 1919 Paris Convention. See Paris Convention, supra
note 17, art. 30.
49. Draft Convention, 1910 Paris International Air Navigation Conference art. 40, May 8 - Jun.
28, 1910.
50. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 8.
51. Hague Rules of Air Warfare art. 10 (1923), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
139-49 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HRAW].
52. Williams, supra note 10, at 96.
53. See ICAO Study, supra note 10, 4.7.1.
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regarded as a State Aircraft operator. 5 4  However, this does not mean that
"NATO" can be the "State" for the purpose of an aircraft being a state aircraft. For
example, NATO aircraft are registered in Luxembourg and display the national
military markings of that State alongside NATO markings.
55
As a final point, it is worth noting that an aircraft could be truly stateless and
be neither a civil nor state aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention. In
such a circumstance, the aircraft would not have the rights or privileges of either
class of aircraft. 6
V. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
As discussed above, "military aircraft" are a subset of state aircraft. 7  In
addition, RPA can be military aircraft.58  Accordingly, the discussion below
applies equally to manned and unmanned aircraft. As discussed above, the
requirements for an aircraft to be a military aircraft so as to amount to being a state
aircraft are simply that the aircraft be used in military service. This is a functional
test and the absence of markings is not ipso facto fatal to a claim of military
aircraft status, though the absence of markings is likely to prejudice such a claim.
What is sometimes overlooked, though, is that separate law applies during an
international armed conflict.
5 9
54. European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Mode S - Harmonisation of the
Transition Arrangements for State Aircraft -Process and Procedures for the Managing of the Mode S
Compliance Status and the Exemptions Granted to State Aircraft, EUROCONTROL (1.1 ed. Aug. 22,
2005), available at http://www.eurocontrol.int/mil/gallery/content/public/milgallery/ documents/Mode
%20S%20%20Process%20and%20Procedures%20for%20State%20Aircraft%20V 11%20Released%201
ssue%20220805%20A4.pdf.
55. Max S. Johnson, NATO Military Headquarters, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING
FORCES 257, 315 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001); see also U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at
188. For background on how and why Luxembourg was chosen, see NATO Airborne Early Warning &
Control Force E-3A Component, Frequently Asked Questions, NATO E-3A COMPONENT,
http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/faq.htm (last visited May 5, 2011). A similar solution for
multinational airlines is discussed in DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 11, at 29. See Ishaq R.
Goreish, The Problem of Registration and Nationality of Aircraft of International Operating Agencies
and the I.C.A.O. Council's Resolution of the Problem (1969) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, McGill
University) (on file with McGill University). For civil aircraft, also see the last sentence of Article 77
of the Chicago Convention, "Nothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more contracting States
from constituting joint air transport operating organizations or international operating agencies and
from pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions, but such organizations or agencies and
such pooled services shall be subject to all the provisions of this Convention, including those relating to
the registration of agreements with the Council. The Council shall determine in what manner the
provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by
international operating agencies." Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 77.
56. See Williams, supra note 10, at 128-29.
57. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(b); Ward, supra note 13, at 6.
58. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 108 (2004); Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, supra note 30,
at 1, 5-6; U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23.
59. See UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 12.1, 12.10.
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There is no treaty law dealing specifically with the marking of military
aircraft beyond that concerning the marking of medical aircraft with the distinctive
emblem (i.e., the red cross, crescent or crystal). 60 Therefore, in an international
armed conflict the relevant legal principles concerning military aircraft are drawn
from customary international law. Whether or not an aircraft is a military aircraft
is important because, unlike civil aircraft and other (i.e., non-military) state
aircraft, military aircraft may exercise belligerent rights.61
As early as 1914, the eminent author on air law, Spaight, proposed that, in
times of war, military aircraft shall bear "the distinctive sign of its character as a
military aircraft of the said Power, irremovable and recognizable at a distance."
62
The HRAW provided that military aircraft be required to "bear an external mark
indicating its nation; and military character ' 63 and non-military state aircraft bear
"an external mark indicating its nationality and its public non-military character., 64
In addition, the external marks should be "so affixed that they cannot be altered
during flight. They shall be as large as practicable and shall be visible from above,
from below and from each side."65 It is generally recognized that the rules laid
down in the HRAW reflect customary international law on these points.66 In
particular, after a thorough review of the literature, Ward concludes that a military
aircraft must bear distinctive marks of both its nationality and military character.
67
Ward also states that following "[t]his practice appears to be universal. 68 Indeed,
in the context of the discussion of markings, it is often assumed that military
aircraft will be marked.
69
It would seem that, strictly speaking, "'public non-military aircraft employed
for customs or police purposes" '70 should bear these marks at all times, whereas
public non-military aircraft "other than those employed for customs or police
60. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 39, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950).
61. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 13.
62. JAMES SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN WAR 114, 72-73 (1914).
63. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 3.
64. Id. art. 4-5.
65. Id. art. 7.
66. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 26-27 (2009);
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, 57, n.103 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
67. Ward, supra note 13, at 17-18. See also Thaher, supra note 36, at 15-17; SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 13(j); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, " 12.10.4; Knut Ipsen,
Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79,
113-14 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008); ROYAL AUSTL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 1.3. For a good review of
the history of military aircraft markings, see JAMES M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 76-99
(3rd ed. 1947).
68. Ward, supra note 13, at 12.
69. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 2-4(d); LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra
note 37, at 114 n. 14. But see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
70. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 4.
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purposes ' 71 would need to bear such marks only "in time of war., 72 However, as
the HRAW were never adopted, the main relevance of the Rules is a source for
customary international law. With the adoption of the Chicago Convention, the
HRAW do not reflect customary international law in peacetime concerning
marking of aircraft. However, those parts of the HRAW concerning marking of
military aircraft do appear to reflect the relevant customary international law
applicable during an international armed conflict.
73
As briefly mentioned above, the importance of satisfying the requirement for
being a "military aircraft" under the law of armed conflict is that during an
international armed conflict, "[m]ilitary aircraft are alone entitled to exercise
belligerent rights. 74  While "belligerent rights" are not defined, those rights
include engaging in hostilities, as well as firing on the enemy and attacking
military objectives. 75 "The term 'hostilities' includes the transmission during flight
of military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent., 76 This last point
needs to be understood in context. The issues concerning the transmission of
military intelligence are whether the person doing so is taking a direct part in
hostilities77 and/or whether the person is a spy.7 8 The more legally interesting
issue is probably the spy issue, as a civilian operator of an RPA that is transmitting
"military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent" is probably taking a
direct part in hostilities regardless of whether or not the RPA has military
markings.
Notwithstanding the conclusion above concerning the marking of military
aircraft, one view has been expressed that while military aircraft are "required to
be marked with appropriate signs of their nationality and military character....
circumstances may exist where such markings are superfluous and are not
required., 79 The example given is "where no other aircraft except those belonging
to a single state are flown." 80 It is arguable that where an aircraft silhouette is so
distinctive that both the nationality and military nature of the aircraft can be
deduced from the silhouette alone, then no markings are required. The marking
requirement originally arose at a time when military and civilian aircraft had
71. Id. art 5.
72. Id.
73. See Ward, supra note 13, at 12.
74. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 13; see also UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 4.1,
4.4.1; ROYAL AuSTL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 2.4; Ward, supra note 13, at 9. While Ward refers to
only civil and military aircraft, that is probably due to the context in which he was writing.
75. See HRAW, supra note 51, art. 16.
76. Id.
77. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 51(1), (3), opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
78. See Id. art. 46.
79. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 7-4.
80. Id. While the 1976 Air Force Pamphlet is no longer in force, a similar position is expressed in
U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23.
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similar designs and when civilian aircraft were adopted for military use." The
problem is that the requirement for military markings has become firmly
entrenched in customary international law. Practically, a problem exists in that the
silhouette would have to be distinctive from above, below and each side. Also, an
issue with relying on silhouette rather than markings arises with captured aircraft.
There have been many occasions where an enemy has flown captured aircraft.82
To avoid allegations of treachery, the captured aircraft should be clearly marked
"with the same markings as the captor's military aircraft., 83 Finally, as aircraft
cannot be operated solely by a coalition but must be attributable to a single nation,
an aircraft type would have to be operated by only one nation.84 Accordingly, for
both legal and operational reasons, the better view is that military aircraft should
be marked, and not rely on silhouette. If, however, a State were of the view that
legally it could rely on a silhouette providing the required level of distinction, then
it would be highly desirable to notify the other belligerent parties that that is the
85
State's position.
The above applies only during an international armed conflict. In a non-
international armed conflict, there is no customary international law requiring the
marking of military aircraft. As long as the government forces operate within the
other rules of international law applicable during a non-international armed
conflict, the government forces may use any type of aircraft with or without
markings - noting that misuse of symbols of protection, like the red
cross/crescent/crystal (the distinctive emblem), is still prohibited. Use of the
distinctive emblem on a RPA that fulfilled the criteria for being a medical aircraft,
not including combat search and rescue, would not be misuse.
8 6
As the non-state actors in a non-international armed conflict have no legal
rights to participate in a conflict in the first place, the issue of the marking of an
aircraft operated by a non-state actor is a legal irrelevancy. Regardless of whether
a non-state actor wears a uniform or operates a "marked" aircraft, the non-state
actor has no legal right to participate in belligerent acts.
8 7
Cheng appears to be of the view that an aircraft can be an "'aircraft in military
service, though not technically a military aircraft." 88 This would mean that the
aircraft would be a State aircraft under ICAO, but not an aircraft that could
81. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 2-4(c).
82. Ward, supra note 13, at 15.
83. Id.; SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 89-91.
84. Examples of more than one nation in a coalition operating the same RPA type are provided at
note 94 infra.
85. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 8. "The external marks, prescribed by the rules in force in each
state, shall be notified promptly to all other Powers." Id.
86. Use of an RPA in a medical role is not hypothetical. The Israel Defense Forces are planning
the use of an RPA for evacuation of wounded. Sapphire Itscovich, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to
Evacuate Injured During Combat, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Aug. 6, 2009, 3:46 pm),
http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/Tech/09/08/0601 .htm.
87. This issue is dealt with in greater detail in Henderson, supra note 1, at 15.
88. Cheng, supra note 9, at 235.
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exercise belligerent rights. This is similar to a related but distinct position that an
aircraft can be a civil aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention but
concurrently a "state aircraft" (used in a broad sense of the term) for non-Chicago
Convention purposes. 89  This type of aircraft has been referred to as auxiliary
aircraft in the San Remo ManuaP° and some military manuals.9' The Commentary
to the Air and Missile Warfare Manual prefers to draw no further distinction and
notes that such aircraft can be simply thought of as state aircraft.92 One example is
a transport aircraft. If the aircraft was owned and operated by the military with
only national markings and no military markings, the aircraft would be a state
aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention (as an aircraft being used in
military service) but would not be a military aircraft for the purposes of the law of
armed conflict.
93
The markings, or lack thereof, on RPAs provide a useful way to illustrate the
above points. Publicly available pictures of RPAs operating in Afghanistan show
that the practice of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and
Australia on markings varies from platform type to platform type - with some
platforms bearing military markings and others having no such markings.
94
89. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 5.2.6.
90. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, §5(13)(k).
91. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 12.5.
92. MINISTRY PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 30, at
52.
93. U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23-24.
94. For the USA see: Image of a Global Hawk, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE,
http://www.afmil/shared/media/photodb/photos/061003-F-7441T-003.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of a Raven, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/shared/media
photodb/photos/070706-f-6751b-204.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011); Image of a Reaper, THE OFFICIAL
WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/090127-F-7383P-
OOI.JPG (last visited May 9, 2011). For the UK see: Image of a Reaper, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceIntemet/Templates/LargeImageTemplate.aspx?img-/NR/rdonlyres/99A043
OA-A361-47C2-9E26-07DDOB8F71B5/0/reaper.jpg&alt--Reapero20UAV (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of an Hermes 450, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/
Templates/LargeImageTemplate.aspx?img=/NR/rdonlyres/DD6ECD25-DE1 B-4F41-9A03-
092EF 1 2B92FB/0/3.jpg&alt=Hermes%/ 20450%/o20unmanned%/ 20air%/o20vehicle%/o20at%/ 20an%/ 20airfiel
d (last visited May 9, 2011). For Australia see: Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT -
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.aulopEx/global/opcatalyst/images/gallery/
20061222/20061206adf8205214_0011.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011); Image of a Scan Eagle,
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/news/
armynews/editions/1174/images/14%20-%20UAV%201aunch%20pad.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/gallery/2010/20100201 c/201001 25adf8246638 374.jpg (last
visited May 9, 2011); and Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/gallery/2010/20100201c/ 20100125adf8 24663
8_370.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011). See also Image of a Heron, NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE
CANADIAN FORCES, http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/potd/photos-eng.asp?id=346 (last
visited May 9, 2011) (The Heron is also operated by Canada in Afghanistan, and can be seen here
showing the distinctive maple-leaf mark).
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Indeed, there is even variation among the same type. 95 Publicly available pictures
of the Australian Scan Eagle on one occasion show a low-visibility kangaroo (a
standard military marking on Australian Army military aircraft), but this marking
does not appear on the other pictures.96 Based on this small sample, what can be
deduced is that the majority of the RPAs have markings, but some of the smaller
RPAs are not marked.
The reasons for this are not known; however, a few observations can be made.
First, the conflict in Afghanistan is, at most, a non-international armed conflict.
97
Accordingly, military aircraft operating in Afghanistan are not required by the law
of armed conflict to be marked. Second, the manner of operation of the RPA may
be evidence of State practice towards an evolving customary international law
norm that smaller RPA that are not armed need not be marked. If this is an
accurate assessment, such practice makes operational sense. There is a point at
which markings no longer serve a useful purpose. The United States Air Force
currently operates an RPA called Wasp III with a wingspan of only 72.3 cm and a
length of 25.4 cm (weighing 453 grams). 98 A RPA called the Defly Micro is under
development that is just "3 grams and has a size of 10 cm from wing tip to wing
tip." 99 Any marking on such RPA, even if "as large as possible,"' 00 would be
practically unobservable in flight.
VI. CONCLUSION
Markings on aircraft are important indicators of an aircraft's status.
Particularly in peacetime, international law makes a distinction between civil and
state aircraft. During an international armed conflict, the primary distinction is
between military aircraft and other aircraft. Where an RPA is used in military
service, an RPA can be a state aircraft, a military aircraft, or both.
Whether an aircraft is a state aircraft is principally a functional test. Strictly
speaking, an aircraft need not have any particular markings to have the status of a
state aircraft. Nonetheless, the lack of markings is likely to prejudice the finding
that an aircraft is a state aircraft - particularly by States other than the operating
State. For example, where an aircraft lacks national markings, a State may have
problems with successfully asserting the rights usually associated with state
aircraft (e.g. sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection).
An aircraft can only have the nationality of one State and there is no concept
of a state aircraft having the "nationality" of an international organization.
95. Id.
96. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, supra note 94.
97. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1408 (2007).
98. Factsheets: Wasp III, U.S AIR FORCE (Nov. 19. 2009), http://www.af.mil/information!
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id= 10469.
99. Delfly Micro, DELFLY, http://www.delfly.nl/?site=DIII&menu=home&lang-en (last visited
May 5, 2011). While it has been referred to here as an RPA, the goal is for fully autonomous flight. As
such, it will ultimately be a misnomer to call it remotely piloted.
100. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 7.
2011
628 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 39:4
However, an aircraft can have the nationality of one State while at the same time
displaying markings showing its relationship to an international organization.
Unlike for state aircraft, the law is much clearer on the requirement that
aircraft have markings in an international armed conflict for that aircraft to have
the status of a military aircraft. This is important, because in an international
armed conflict, only military aircraft should exercise belligerent rights. The law of
marking for military aircraft is customary in nature, and the law may be evolving
toward not requiring such markings on small RPA where the size of the RPA
means that any markings will be so small as to serve no practical purpose.
